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THE EVOLUTION AND FUTURE OF
SUBSTANTIAL NEXUS IN STATE TAXATION
OF CORPORATE INCOME
Abstract: The proper nexus standard for state taxation of out-of-state
corporations has been a contentious issue since the U.S. Supreme Court
decided Quill Corp. v. North Dakota in 1992. In that case, the Court up-
held a physical presence standard, but numerous state courts have since
affirmed economic presence standards, holding that the state can tax
corporations with no physical presence within its borders. This Note ex-
amines the evolution of state taxation of out-of-state corporations, in-
cluding some of the most recent state tax court decisions on the topic,
and analyzes whether there are any overarching principles that may be
gleaned from the various decisions. The Note then considers possible
consequences of the proliferation of the economic presence standard
and whether there is any limit to its application.
INTRODUCTION
The debate over the proper nexus requirement for state taxation
of corporations has been ongoing since the U.S. Supreme Court de-
cided Quill cal,. v. North Dakota in 1992. 1 In Quill, the Court reaffirmed
its 1967 decision in National Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue, where it
held that a state cannot collect a use tax from a vendor that limited its
contacts with a state to communications effected solely by mail and
common carrier. 2
The debate over the proper nexus requirement is important be-
cause the reach of the states' jurisdiction to tax net corporate income
greatly affects both multistate corporations and the states in which they
1 504 U.S. 298, 319 (1992). See generally Doug Sheppard et A, Shining a Blue Light on
Nexus: Katz and Rosen Debate the Kmart Decision, 23 ST. TAX Novas 847 (2002) (debating the
New Mexico Court of Appeals' decision in Kmart Properties Inc. v. Taxation and Revenue DO-
tartment, 131 P.3d 27 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001), and the appropriate substantial nexus standard
for imposing a corporate income tax on a corporation that is not physically present within
a state); John A. Swain, State Income Tax jurisdiction: A jurisprudential and Policy Perspective, 45
& MARY L. REV. 321 (2003) (concluding that a corporation need not be physically
present within a state to have an income tax nexus with that state).
2 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 311; Nat'l Bellas Hess v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758
(1967); Michael T. Fatale, State Tax Jurisdiction and the Mythical "Physical Presence" Constitu-
tional Standard, 54 TAx LAW. 105, 106 (2000) (arguing that there is no physical presence
requirement for corporate income taxes or any other type of taxes).
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do business. 3 As the national economy becomes more integrated, cor-
porations frequently do business in multiple states. 4 For their part,
states would like to reach the coffers of these corporations to fill their
own depleted treasuries. 5 The problem arises because many of these
corporations do not have even a minimal physical presence in the states
that wish to tax them, and the U.S. Supreme Court has been unclear
about the jurisdiction requirements that would allow the states to tax
these corporations. 6
There are two basic viewpoints regarding what amount of contact
with a state is sufficient to permit the state to tax the income of the
corporation.? One view mandates the physical presence of the corpora-
tion in the state for the state to be able to assert its taxation power over
the corporation. 8 The other view holds that a corporation's traditional
physical presence is unnecessary and that the corporation's economic
presence in a state is alone sufficient to permit taxation of the corpora-
tion by that state. 9 Economic presence refers to the situation where a
corporation does business in a state and derives revenue from those
activities, without having an actual physical presence within the state. 10
The Supreme Court has unequivocally held that economic pres-
ence is sufficient for a plaintiff to hale an out-of-state corporation into
3 See Swain, supra note 1, at 321.
4 See id.
5 See id. at 321 n.l.
8 See id. at 321.
7 See id. at 323. John Swain explains the difference between a nexus with the taxpayer
and a nexus with the income, transaction, or property sought to be taxed. Id. at 328-29. As
in Swain's article, this Note will focus on the former. See id. These two types of nexus are
related but the former is a juriidictional issue while the latter is more of a fair apportion-
ment issue. See id.
8 See Swain, supra note 1, at 323. See generally J.C. Penney Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 19
S.W.3d 831 (Tenn. CL App. 1999).
9 See Swain, supra note 1, at 322. See generally Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n (Geoffrey
I), 437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993).
See R. Todd Ervin, State Taxation of Financial Institutions: Will Physical Presence or Eco-
nomic Presence Win the Day?, 19 VA. TAX REV. 515, 531-32 (2000) (explaining that the basic
premise of economic nexus is that economic realities, such as the benefits and opportuni-
ties provided by the taxing state, should determine whether a corporation has a substantial
nexus with a state, instead of relying solely on whether the corporation has a physical pres-
ence within the taxing state); Swain, supra note 1, at 321. The line between physical pres-
ence and economic presence is not cut and dry, such that depending on the circum-
stances, it may be unclear whether a corporation has a physical presence in a state. See
Michael T. Fatale, Federalism and State Business Activity Tax Nexus: Revisiting Public Law 86-
272, 21 VA. TAX REV. 435, 502 n.358 (2002). A typical example of a company that has an
economic presence in a state, but not a traditional physical presence, is a mail-order com-
pany that makes sales in a state where it has no offices or personnel. See Quill, 504 U.S. at
303.
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court tinder the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution." The
Court's state tax jurisprudence, however, has resulted in a two-prong
approach, focusing on both the Due Process Clause and the Dormant
Commerce Clause. 12 Under the Due Process Clause prong, economic
presence is sufficient because doing business in a state gives enough
notice to the corporation that they may be subject to the laws and tax-
ing authority of that state."
The Supreme Court explained the test for whether a state tax
passes muster under the Dormant Commerce Clause in Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady in 1977.14 A state tax is constitutional under the
Dormant Commerce Clause if it is assessed against a taxpayer with
whom the state has a substantial nexus, is fairly apportioned, is nondis-
criminatory, and is fairly related to the services provided by the state."
Under this test, a nonresident taxpayer must have established a sub-
stantial nexus with a state in order to be subject to that state's taxing
jurisdiction." States traditionally relied on physical presence within the
state to prove the existence of a substantial nexus, but more recently,
states are asserting jurisdiction based on economic presence.''
In the past few years, a number of states have taxed corporations
that did not have a traditional physical presence in the taxing state."
Many of those corporations brought suit challenging the state's juris-
diction over them." Those cases are all at the state level, and so far,
the Supreme Court has denied certiorari to all such cases, leaving un-
resolved the issue of whether states can tax the net income of non-
resident corporations. 2°
" See Quill, 504 U.S. at 308; Swain, supra note 1, at 322.
12 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 305; Geoffrey I, 437 S.E.2d at 16; Swain, supra note 1, at 322.
15 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 312; Swain, supra note 1, at 334.
14 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
15 See id. at 279; Swain, supra note 1, at 328.
16 See Ervin, supra note 10, at 516.
17 See id.
18 See, e.g., Lanco, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation (Lanco II), 908 A.2d 176, 177 (N.J.
2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct 2973 (2007); Kmart Props., Inc. v. Taxation and Revenue
Dep't, 131 P.Sd 27, 36 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001), cert. granted, 40 P.3d 1008 (N.M. 2002), cert,
quashed, 131 P.3d 22 (N.M. 2005); A & F Trademark, Inc. v. Tolson, 605 S.E.2d 187, 195
(N.C. Ct. App. 2004); Geoffrey, Inc. v Okla. Tax Comm'n (Geoffrey II), 132 P.Sd 632, 638
(Okla. Civ. App. 2006); Tax Comm'r v. MBNA Am. Bank, NA, 640 S.E.2d 226, 234 (W. Va.
2006), cert. denied, 127 S. CL 2997 (2007).
19 See, e.g., Lanco II, 908 A.2d at 176; Kmart Props., 131 P.3d at 30; A ce F Tkademark, 605
S.E.2d at 189; Geoffrey 17, 132 P.3d at 633; MBNA, 640 S.E.2d at 227.
2° See, e.g., A Co' F Trademark, 605 S.E.2d 187, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 821 (2005); Geoffrey
437 S.E.2d 13, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 992 (1993). Although Lanco and MBNA had filed peti-
tions for certiorari in March 2007, the Supreme Court refused to take up the cases. Patrice
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Congress, however, may exercise its plenary power under the
Commerce Clause to determine the appropriate nexus standard. 2 i In
1959 Congress passed Public Law 86-272 ("P.L. 86-272"), which created
a safe harbor for sellers of tangible personal property whose activities
within a state were limited to solicitation. 22 P.L. 86-272, however, does
not mention anything about services or intangibles, because those sec-
tors of the economy were not widely present in 1959. 23 On April 28,
2005, a bill was introduced in the House of Representatives that aimed
to include both intangibles and services in the safe harbor provision of
P.L. 86-272. 24 Additionally, the bill sought to codify a physical presence
standard for net income and other business activity taxes. 26 Hearings on
this bill, known as the Business Activity Tax Simplification Act, were
held in the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law on
September 27, 2005. 26 The bill was reported to the House in July 2006,
and a related bill was introduced in the Senate on May 4, 2006. 27 Al-
though a House floor vote on the bill was postponed in the summer of
2006,28 a new Senate bill entitled the Business Activity Tax Simplifica-
Gay, U.S. Supreme Court Will Not Hear Business Tax Nexus Cases, 44 ST. TAx NOTES 925, 925
(2007); see Lanco II, 908 A.2d 176' (NJ. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2973 (2007); MBNA,
640 S.E.2d 226 (W. Va. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2997 (2007).
21 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 318; Swain, supra note 1, at 323-24.
22 Pub. L. No. 86-272, 73 Stat. 555 (1959) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 381 (2000)). As
noted by Swain, although the law has been incorporated into the U.S. Code, state and
local tax professionals still refer to it as P.L. 86-272 and this Note will also. See Swain supra
note 1, at 324-25. Congress enacted P.L. 86-272 in response to Northwestern States Portland
Cement Co. v. Minnesota, where the Supreme Court held that Minnesota could tax the ap-
portioned income of the taxpayer even though its business in Minnesota consisted solely of
soliciting orders for the sale of its product. 358 U.S. 450, 452 (1959); see Swain, supra note
1, at 352-53. The taxpayer had a teased sales office and several salespeople in Minnesota,
granting it a physical presence in the state, but Congress and some commentators believed
that the natural consequence of the decision would be taxation by states where there was
no physical presence at all. See Swain, supra note 1, at 352-53. P.L. 86-272 created a safe
harbor for sellers of tangible personal property whose only activity in a state is the solicita-
tion of orders, provided that the orders are forwarded out-of-state for acceptance and the
goods are shipped from an out-of-state location. See 15 U.S.0 § 381; Swain, supra note 1, at
352-53.
23 See Swain, supra note 1, at 325.
24 Business Activity Tax Simplification Act of 2005, H.R. 1956, 108th Cong. (2005).
" Id.
" See generally Business Activity Tax Simplification Act of 2005: Hearing on H.R. 1956 Before
the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law, 109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter Busi-
ness Tax Hearing].
27 Business Activity Tax Simplification Act of 2006, S. 2721, 109th Cong. (2006); H.R.
1956.
28 See E-mail from Branden Ritchie, Legislative Director and Counsel, Office of Con-
gressman Bob Goodlatte (Nov. 20, 2006, 12:08 EST) (on file with author).
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tion .Act of 2007 was introduced by Senator Charles Schumer on June
28, 2007.29
Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has addressed the juris-
dictional issue, either in favor of the states or in favor of the taxpayers."
In the meantime, this area of law is fraught with uncertainty both for
taxpayers and states. 31 One of the most uncertain areas concerns the
definition of the "substantial nexus," which is required under the first
prong of the Complete Auto Transit test.32 This Note addresses the evolu-
tion and future of substantial nexus from its first articulation in Complete
Auto Transit. Part I discusses the historical development of substantial
nexus.33 Part II analyzes the recent state court decisions addressing sub-
stantial nexus in the corporate income tax scenario and their justifica-
tions for moving towards an economic presence standard." Part BI
then applies the concept of substantial nexus to different industries
likely to be affected by an expansion of the economic presence stan-
dard in the future. 33
I. THE HISTORY OF SUBSTANTIAL NEXUS
A. The Development of the Concept of Substantial Nexus
The first major case in the line of decisions leading up to the cur-
rent debate on the state taxation jurisdiction was National Bellas Hess,
Inc. v. Department of Revenue, decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in
1967.36 In that , case, the appellant, National Bellas Hess ("Bellas Hess"),
was a mail order company with its principal place of business in North
Kansas City, Missouri.37 Bellas Hess was licensed to do business only in
29 Business Activity Tax Simplification Act of 2007, S. 1726, 110th Cong. 1 (2007).
" See generally Kirk]. Stark, State Tax Shelters and U.S. Fiscal Federalism, 42 ST. TAX Nous
773 (2006); Swain, supra note 1, at 323,325.
31 See Swain, supra note 1, at 323; see, e.g., Lanco II, 908 A.2d at 177; Kamm Props., 131
P.3d at 36; A dr' F Trademark, 605 S.E.2d at 195; Geoffrey II, 132 13.3d at 638; J.C. Penney, 19
S.W.3d at 842; MBNA, 640 S.E.2d at 234.
32 See 430 U.S. at 279; Geoffrey I, 437 S.E.2d at 18; J.G. Penney, 19 S.W.3d at 842.
ss See infra notes 36-198 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 199-264 and accompanying text.
35 See infra notes 265-294 and accompanying text. This Note will not address whether
an economic presence or physical presence standard is the ideal standard. Many commen-
tators have made excellent arguments regarding which standard should be adopted. See
generally, Ervin, supra note 10; Swain, supra note 1. A normative analysis of the standards is
beyond the scope of this Note.
3° See 386 U.S. 753,753 (1967); Swain, supra note 1, at 322.
Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 753-54.
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Missouri and Delaware, where it was incorporated. 38 The lllinois De-
partment of Revenue obtained a judgment from the Illinois Supreme
Court requiring Bellas Hess to collect and remit use taxes to the State
of Illinois, even though the company had no physical presence in Illi-
nois." Bellas Hess argued before the U.S. Supreme Court that its taxa-
tion by the state of Illinois was in violation of the company's rights un-
der the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Dormant Commerce Clause."
The Court concluded that Bellas Hess's constitutional objections
were closely related and that the test for whether a state tax on inter-
state commerce is allowable is similar to the test for a state's compliance
with due process.41 In terms of the Due Process Clause, the Court af-
firmed that the test is "whether the state has given anything for which it
can ask return.'" Similarly, in terms of taxation of interstate com-
merce, the Court explained that taxation of companies with no physical
presence in the state is allowable to the extent that the tax causes the
company bear a fair share of the cost of the state whose protection it
enjoys.'" In prior cases, the Court had examined use taxes and upheld
the power of a state to impose liability on an out-of-state seller in a vari-
ety of circumstances." Specifically, the Court had held that a state may
impose a use tax liability on an out-of-state seller where the sales were
arranged by local agents in the taxing state and where the out-of-state
seller maintained local retail stores." As justification for those deci-
sions, the Court explained that in those situations, the out-of-state seller
was "plainly accorded the protection and services of the taxing state."'"
The Court explained that it had never held that a state may im-
pose a use tax collection duty on a seller whose only connection to the
taxing state was by common carrier or U.S. mail. 47 Thus, the Court in
38 Id. at 754.
32 Id.; see also Ervin, supra note 10, at 532 n.72 (explaining that both sales and use taxes
require the retailer to act as a collection agent for the tax and that a sales tax is imposed
on sales occurring within the taxing state, whereas a use tax is imposed on goods pur-
chased outside the state but then brought into the state for use or consumption).




" Id. at 757; see also Gen. Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335, 337 (1943);
Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, 364 (1940); Nelson v. Montgomery Ward &
Co., 312 U.S. 373, 375 (1940); Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62, 66 (1938).
Bell= Has, 386 U.S. at 757.
48 Id.
47 Id. at 758.
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National Bellas Hess endorsed a physical presence nexus and rejected
the economic presence argument advanced by the Illinois Department
of Revenue.° It held that the mail order transactions at issue in the
case were exclusively interstate, and if Illinois's power to tax Bellas Hess
was upheld, the burdens on interstate commerce would be tremen-
dous.49 The Court therefore found that the Illinois use tax as applied to
Bellas Hess was unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause." It
stated that "[t]he very purpose of the Commerce Clause [is] to ensure
a national economy free from such unjustifiable local entanglements:11
The next important decision in the line of cases leading up to the
current debate on physical versus economic nexus occurred in Complete
Auto Transit, Inc v. Brady, decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1977. 52
The tax at issue in Complete Auto Transit was a privilege tax, where Mis-
sissippi taxed Complete Auto for the privilege of doing business in the
state.55 The issue was whether the privilege tax was unconstitutional
under the Dormant Commerce Clause." The Court announced the
rule that a tax may be sustained against a Dormant Commerce Clause
challenge if it is (1) applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with
the taxing state, (2) is fairly apportioned, (3) does not discriminate
against interstate commerce, and (4) is fairly related to the services
provided by the state. 55 Subsequent cases have referred to this standard
as the Complete Auto Transit test, and have applied it when evaluating the
constitutionality of a tax under the Dormant Commerce Clause. 56
45 See id.
43 See id. at 759 (explaining that "if Illinois can impose such burdens, so can every
other State, and so, indeed, can every municipality, every school district, and every other
political subdivision throughout the Nation with power to impose sales and use taxes").
55 See Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 760.
51 Id.
55 See 430 U.S. 274, 274 (1977).
53 Id. at 274.
" See id.
55 Id. at 279; see also Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1992) (describing
the four-part test and pointing out that Bellas Hess concerned the first prong—substantial
nexus—of the test).
56 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 310; Kmart Props., Inc. v. Taxation and Revenue Dept, 131 P.3d
27, 34 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001), cert. granted, 40 P.3d 1008 (N.M. 2002), cert. quashed, 131 P.3d
22 (N.M. 2005); A & F Trademark, Inc. v. Tolson, 605 S.E.2d 187, 193 (N.C. Ct. App.
2004); Geoffrey, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm'n (Geoffrey II), 132 P.3d 632, 635 (Okla. Civ. App.
2006); Geoffrey, Inc, v. S.C. Tax Comm'n (Geoffrey I), 437 S.E.2d 13, 18 (S.C. 1993); Am.
Online, Inc. v. Johnson, No. M2001-00927-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 1751434, at *2 (Tenn. Ct.
App. July 30, 2002); J.C. Penney Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 19 S.W.2d 831, 838 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1999); see also Christina M. Lyons, The Constitutionality of the Worldwide Combined Reporting
Method of Taxation of Multinational Corporations: Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Board, 37
B.C. L. REV. 183, 192 (1995).
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After Complete Auto Transit was decided in 1977, no other major
cases addressed the issue of states imposing taxes on out-of-state com-
panies until Quill corp. v. North Dakota was decided by the Supreme
Court in 1991.57 Quill involved North Dakota's attempt to require an
out-of-state, mail-order house that had neither outlets nor sales repre-
sentatives in North Dakota to collect and pay a use tax on goods pur-
chased for use within the state." The Court analyzed the North Da-
kota tax under the Complete Auto Transit test and observed that the
substantial nexus prong and the fairly related prong of the test limit
the reach of the state's taxing authority to ensure that state taxation
does not unduly burden interstate commerce.59 The fairly appor-
tioned prong and the no discrimination against interstate commerce
prong prohibit taxes that pass an unfair share of the tax burden onto
interstate commerce.°
In Quill, the Court began its analysis by noting that although the
taxpayer's claims of unconstitutionality under the Due Process Clause
and the Commerce Clause were closely related, they posed different
limits on the taxing powers of the states." The Court acknowledged
that although in the past it had not always been precise in distinguish-
ing between the analyses under the two clauses, the Due Process
Clause and the Commerce Clause are analytically distinct and reflect
different constitutional concerns. 62 The Due Prdcess Clause concerns
the fundamental fairness of governmental activity, and as such, notice
or fair warning is the key to a due process analysis. 63 The focus of the
Commerce Clause and its substantial nexus requirement is not on
fairness for the individual defendant, but concerns the effects of state
regulation on the national economy." The Court in Quill explained
that under the Articles of Confederation, state taxes and duties "hin-
dered and suppressed interstate commerce; the Framers intended the
Commerce Clause as a cure for these structural ills.”65 Therefore, in
Quill, the Court reiterated that the Commerce Clause prohibits dis-
"See Quill, 504 U.S. at 301; Swain, supra note 1, at 329.
58 Quig 504 U.S. at 301.
59 See id. at 313.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 305.
62 Id.
65 Quill, 504 U.S. at 312.
64 Id.
65 Id.
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crimination against interstate commerce and bars state regulations
that unduly burden interstate commerce."
The Due Process Clause requires at least some connection be-
tween a state and a taxpayer the state is seeking to tax. 67 The Court in
Quill pointed out that due process jurisprudence had evolved substan-
tially since Bellas Hess was decided." Most of the change in the due
process jurisprudence was sparked by the Court's 1945 decision in In-
ternational Shoe v. Washington.69 International Shoe held that, in the con-
text of personal jurisdiction, the relevant inquiry is whether a defen-
dant has minimum contacts with the jurisdiction such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice." In accordance with the decision in Interna-
tional Shoe, the Court in Quill abandoned the formalistic tests that fo-
cused on a defendant's presence within a state in favor of a more flexi-
ble inquiry into whether a defendant's contacts with the forum make it
reasonable to require the defendant to defend the suit in that state. 71 In
decisions following International Shoe, the Court held that if an out-of-
state corporation purposefully availed itself of the benefits of an eco-
nomic market in.the forum state, it possibly subjects itself to the state's
in personam jurisdiction even where there is no physical presence in the
state. 72 The Court applied these previous due process decisions to the
issue in Quill and held that the imposition of the use tax on a mail-
order house that is engaged in continuous and widespread solicitation
of business within a state is justified. 73 A corporation with continuous
and widespread contacts with a state has fair warning that its activity
may subject it to the jurisdiction of that state. 74 As the Court in Quill
noted, t matters little that such solicitation is accomplished by a
deluge of catalogs rather than a phalanx of drummers: the require-
ments of due process are met irrespective of a corporation's lack of
physical presence in the taxing State." 75 The Court concluded that
es
67 See id at 306 (citing Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954)).
68 Quill, 504 U.S. at 307.
to Id. See generally Inel Shoe v Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
70 Quill, 504 U.S. at 307; Intl Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
71 Quill, 504 U.S. at 307.
" Id. In personam jurisdiction is defined as a "court's power to bring a person into its
adjudicative process; jurisdiction over a defendant's personal rights, rather than merely
over property interests." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 870 (8th ed. 2004).
73 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 308; see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476
(1985); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977).
74 Quill, 504 U.S. at 308 (citing Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 218 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
78 Id.
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physical presence is therefore not necessary to satisfy the inquiry under
the Due Process Clause, and that Quill purposefully directed its activi-
ties at North Dakota residents. 76 Thus, in Quill the Due Process Clause
did not bar enforcement of North Dakota's use tax. 77
The Court in Quill also discussed the validity of the use tax under
the Dormant Commerce Clause. 78 It applied the four-part test eluci-
dated in Complete Auto Transit to Quill's contacts with North Dakota. 79
It stated that a taxpayer engaged in interstate commerce can be made
to pay its fair share of state taxes so long as it satisfies the four prongs
of the Complete Auto Transit test. 80 The Court went on to note that had
Bellas Hess been decided at this time, contemporary Commerce Clause
jurisprudence might have dictated a different outcome, but the Court
also asserted that Bellas Hess is not inconsistent with Complete Auto
Transits' The Complete Auto Transit test in part reflects the Court's
concern about unduly burdensome state regulations. 82 Therefore, the
Court found that the substantial nexus requirement of the Complete
Auto Transit test is not, like due process's minimum contacts require-
ment, "a proxy for notice, but rather a means for limiting state bur-
dens on interstate commerce."83 Because the two clauses address dif-
ferent concerns, it is possible for a corporation to have the minimum
contacts necessary as required by the Due Process Clause and still lack
the substantial nexus with the state as required by the Commerce •
Clause.° Substantial nexus, therefore, requires something more than
minimum contacts.°
The Court indicated that Quill's situation was one in which the
corporation had sufficient minimum contacts to justify the tax under
the Due Process Clause, yet lacked the substantial nexus necessary to
satisfy the Commerce Clause.° Therefore, it disagreed with North Da-
kota, and did not conclude that Bellas Hess should be overturned, de-
spite its holding that physical presence within a state is necessary for a
78 Id.
77 Id.
78 See id. at 309.
78 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 310.
80 See id. at 310 n.5.
8L J at 311.
81 See id. at 313.
83 Id.
8' Quill, 504 U.S. at 313.
85 Ervin, supra note 10, at 537; see Quill, 504 U.S. at 313.
85 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 313.
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tax on interstate commerce to be valid. 87 The Court concluded that
although its Commerce Clause jurisprudence now favors a more flexi-
ble balancing approach, there are benefits to maintaining a bright-line
physical presence rule described in cases such as Bellas Hess.88 The
bright-line rule of Bellas Hess advances the ends of the Dormant Com-
merce Clause by preventing undue burdens on interstate commerce. 89
The Court explained that undue burdens on interstate commerce may
be avoided both by a case-by-case analysis of the burden imposed by a
certain tax, but also by exempting a discrete realm of commercial activ-
ity from interstate taxation." The justification for maintaining a bright-
line rule is its clarity for both the states and corporations, encouraging
settled expectations, and fostering investment by businesses and indi-
viduals.91
In Quill, the Court stated that the fact that a few of Quill's floppy
disks were located in North Dakota did not allow North Dakota to meet
the substantial nexus requirement of the Commerce Clause, test be-
cause the contact between Quill and North Dakota was de minimus. 92
Due to the lack of direct physical connection between Quill and North
Dakota, the Court concluded that North Dakota's imposition of the use
tax on Quill was unconstitutional under the Dormant Commerce
Clause.93 The Court, however, was ambiguous about whether the physi-
cal presence requirement extends to taxes other than sales and use
taxes." Since Quill, the Court has declined to grant certiorari to any
state tax case petitions on this issue. 93
Whether Quilts holding extended to other types of taxes was
tested soon afterwards in Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission
(Geoffrey I), decided by the Supreme Court of South Carolina in 1993.96
Geoffrey was a wholly-owned, second-tier subsidiary of Toys "R" Us,
Inc., incorporated and headquartered in Delaware. 97 Geoffrey did not
67 See id. at 314.
as Id.
so Id. at 314-15.
99 See id.
91 Quill, 504 U.S. at 315-16.
92 Id. at 315 n.8.
See id. at 319.
91 See id. at 314, 317; Geoffrey 1, 437 S.E.2d at 18 n.4; Swain, supra note 1, at 337.	 •
95 See generally Lanco, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation (Lanco II), 908 A.2d 176 (N.J. 2006),
cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2973 (2007); A 49F Tharkmark 605 S.E.2d 187, cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
353 (2005); Geoffrey I, 437 S.E.2d 13, cert. denied, 510 U.S. .992 (1993); Tax Comm'r v.
MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 640 S.E.2d 226 (W. Va. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2997 (2007).
" See 437 S.E.2d at 18.
97 Geoffrey 1 437 S.E.2d at 15.
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have any employees or offices in South Carolina. 98 In 1984 Geoffrey
became the owner of several valuable trademarks and trade names of
Toys "R" Us, including the name, 'Toys 'R' Us." 99 In an arrangement
typical of such intangible holding companies, Geoffrey licensed the use
of the trademarks and trade names to Toys "R" Us in exchange for a
percentage royalty of Toys "R" Us's net sales.'" This arrangement cre-
ated what has been dubbed "nowhere income," because the royalty in-
come paid to Geoffrey is never taxed due to Delaware's lack of an in-
come tax imposition on royalties. 191 The agreement also benefited Toys
"R" Us because they were able to lower their taxable income through
royalty payments to Geoffrey.'" The effectiveness of the strategy was
undeniable: in 1990, Geoffrey, without any full-time employees, had an
income of approximately $55 million and paid no income taxes any-
where.'" The South Carolina Tax Commission ultimately concluded
that Geoffrey was required to pay income taxes on its royalty income.'"
The South Carolina Supreme Court assessed the validity of the in-
come tax by examining it under the Due Process and Commerce
Clause rubrics set out by the U.S. Supreme Court in Qui/L 198 The state
court held that the nexus requirement of the Due Process Clause can
be satisfied where a corporation has no physical presence in the taxing
state so long as the corporation has purposefully directed its activity at
the state's economy.'" Thus, by choosing to license its trademarks and
trade names for use by Toys "R" Us in numerous states, the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court found that Geoffrey "contemplated and purpose-
fully sought the benefit of economic contact with those states." 107
Geoffrey also satisfied the due process requirement because its in-
tangibles were located in South Carolina.'" Geoffrey argued that the
intangibles were situated at its corporate headquarters in Delaware, but
the South Carolina Supreme Court rejected that argument, following
instead the view of the U.S. Supreme Court in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commis-




101 See id. at 15 n.1.
WI See Geoffrey I, 437 S.E.2d at 15.
I" Id. at 15 n.l.
1114 leL at 15.
1DD See id. at 16-18.
no Id. at 16.
107 Geoffrey I, 437 S.E.2d at 16.
103 Id,
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to a single situs. 103 Geoffrey further argued that South Carolina did not
confer any benefits on the corporation to which the income tax could
be rationally related." 0 The court disagreed." It held that the real
source of Geoffrey's income in South Carolina was the state's Toys "R"
Us customers, and that by providing an orderly society in which Toys
"R" Us conducts business, South Carolina made it possible for Geoffrey
to earn income pursuant to the royalty agreement." 2 The fact that
Geoffrey earned income in South Carolina was evidence of the protec-
tion, benefits, and opportunities granted to it by South Carolina, and
because the state seeks only to tax that portion of Geoffrey's income
generated within the state, the tax is rationally related to the advantages
of doing business in the state.'" The combination of purposeful direc-
tion, possession of intangibles in South Carolina, and a rational rela-
tionship between the company's activities and the tax levied on it., led
the South Carolina Supreme Court to hold that the Due Process Clause
test had been satisfied.'"
In addition to disputing the constitutionality of the income tax
under the Due Process Clause, Geoffrey advanced a Commerce Clause
argument under the Complete Auto Transit test, which requires a substan-
tial nexus with the taxing state.'" In its argument, Geoffrey relied on
Quill, stating that it did not have a substantial nexus with South Caro-
lina because it was not physically present in the state.'" The court dis-
agreed with Geoffrey, distinguishing Bellas Hess from the case at issue
because that case only applied to sales and use taxes, and not to income
taxes.'" Therefore, the court held that by licensing intangibles for use
in South Carolina and deriving income from their use there, Geoffrey
had a substantial nexus with South Carolina, and the income tax was
constitutional." An economic presence was sufficient for a finding of
substantial nexus.'"
1°9 Id. at 17: see Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'n of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 445 (1980) (hold-
ing that a corporation organized under the laws of New York, but doing business in many
states, including Vermont, may have its intangible property located in more than one
state).
Ito See Geoffrey I, 437 S.E.2d at 17.
In See id. at 18.
IIx id.
ns
114 Id. at 17-18.
115 See Geoffrey 1, 437 S.E.2d at 18.
116 See id.
117 See id. at 18 & n.4.
118 Id. at 18.
119 See id.
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B. Recent Applications of Substantial Nexus
A number of recent state tax cases have held in favor of the states'
power to tax the income of out-of-state corporations based on the cor-
poration's economic presence in the state.'" In America Online, Inc. v.
Johnson, decided by the Appeals Court of Tennessee in 2002, Tennessee
sought to tax America Online even though it did not own or lease any
real property in Tennessee and did not have any regular employees in
the state. 121 The America Online service, however, was provided to
Tennessee residents through modems and other component parts lo-
cated in Tennessee. 122 The Appeals Court of Tennessee decided that
this case had entirely to do with the first prong of the Complete Auto
Transit test, which requires a substantial nexus between the taxpayer
corporation and the taxing state.'" The Tennessee court interpreted
prior U.S. Supreme Court decisions as rejecting state taxes on interstate
commerce "where no activities had been carried on in the taxing state
on the taxpayer's behalf. "124 Furthermore, the Tennessee court held that
the activity being taxed must itself have a substantial nexus with the
state. 125 The court found that there were a substantial number of busi-
nesses operating in Tennessee helping to make America Online avail-
able to Tennessee customers, and therefore the activities conducted on
America Online's behalf could be more than de minimus.'" The court,
however, concluded that the record developed by the Chancery Court
was incomplete and as a result, the question of whether America
Online's nexus with the state satisfied the substantial nexus prong of
the Complete Auto Transit test was still unresolved, and the case was re-
manded for resolution of that question. 127
In Kmart Properties, Inc. v. Taxation and Revenue Department, decided
by the Appeals Court of New Mexico in 2001, Kmart Properties, Inc.
("KPI"), a wholly-owned Michigan subsidiary of Kmart Corporation,
challenged New Mexico's assessment of a corporate income tax upon
12° See generally Lanco II, 908 A.2d 176; &nay Corp. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 131
P.3c1 22 (N.M. 2005); A Co' F Trademark 605 S.E.2d 187; Geoffrey II, 132 P.3d 632; MBNA, 640
S.E.2d 226.
121 2002 WL 1751434, at *1.
122 Id at *1-2.
l" Id. at *2.
124 id.
125 Id. at *3.
126 See Am. Online, 2002 WL 1751434, at *3.
"7 Id. at *4.
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royalties paid by Kmart Corporation to KPI. 128 KPI and Kmart Corpora-
tion had a royalty and licensing arrangement similar to the one at issue
in Geoffrey L 128 Kmart Corporation created KPI for the purpose of hold-
ing title to and managing the trademarks, trade names, and service
marks originally developed and used by Kmart Corporation,'"
KPI was a typical passive investment company ("PIC" ). 131 A passive
investment company is a tax-planning device whereby a corporation
sets up a holding company and transfers all of the corporation's valu-
able intangible property to the holding company in a tax-free transac-
tion. 132 The holding company is known as a passive investment com-
pany, or PIC, and is usually incorporated in a state where it will not be
subject to income taxation.'" The PIC then licenses the intangible
property back to the corporation in exchange for royalty payments, and
the corporation may then use the intangible property wherever it sees
fit. 184 Kmart Corporation transferred all the intellectual property to
KPI, and then licensed it back for use in exchange for a royalty pay-
ment to KPI. 185
New Mexico's income tax laws allowed Kmart Corporation to
take a business deduction for royalty payments made to KPI, which
reduced, and in some years, altogether eliminated Kmart Corpora-
tion's income tax liability in New Mexico. 136 Meanwhile, because KPI
paid state taxes only in Michigan, which does not tax income from
royalty payments, the New Mexico Department of Taxation and Reve-
nue calculated that during the tax assessment period at issue in Kmart
Properties, Inc., KPI earned royalty income in excess of $2 million per
year from conducting business in New Mexico, and that revenue was
never taxed anywhere. 187
125 131 P.M at 30 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001), cert. granted, 40 P.M 1008 (N.M. 2002), cert.
quashed, 131 P.3d 22 (N.M. 2005) (quashing certiorari on the corporate income tax issues





152 See Fatale supra note 2, at 135 (describing the general PIC transaction); Cory D. Ol-
son, Comment, Follow the Giraffe's Lead—Lanco, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation Gets
Lost in the Quagmire That Is State Taxation, 6 MINN. J. L. Scr. & TECH. 789, 800-01 (2005)
(detailing the formation of a PIC).
1" See Fatale, supra note 2, at 135; Olson, supra note 132, at 800-01,
134 See Fatale, supra note 2, at 135; Olson, supra note 132, at 800-01.
"5 See Kmart Props., 131 P.3d at 30-31.
06 Id. at 31.
177 Id.
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The court held that KPI established and maintained sufficient
minimum contacts with New Mexico to satisfy the requirements of the
Due Process Clause.'" As for the Commerce Clause analysis, the court
acknowledged that the standard it imposes is more demanding than
the standard under the Due Process Clause.'" After an examination
of the Quill and Bellas Hess decisions, the court in Kmart decided not
to extend the Quill and Bellas Hess analyses to income taxes, because it
concluded that income taxes are not sufficiently similar to the sales
and use taxes discussed in Quill and Bellas Hess, and therefore, a
physical presence standard should not apply to them. 14° Although the
court did not attempt to differentiate the substantial nexus require-
ments from the minimum contacts requirements, it concluded that
the use of KPI's marks hi New Mexico, for the purpose of generating
income for KPI, established a sufficient nexus between the income
and the state to justify the imposition of an income tax."' After ini-
tially granting certiorari, the Supreme Court of New Mexico quashed
certiorari for all issues relating to the corporate income tax, and or-
dered that the Appeals Court decision be filed concurrently with its
decision on the other issues. 142
In 2004 in A &F Trad,entath, Inc. v. Tolson, the Court of Appeals of
North Carolina reaffirmed the economic presence standard for the
Commerce Clause analysis.' 43 A & F Trademark, a wholly-owned sub-
sidiary corporation of The Limited, Inc., appealed the assessment of
corporate income taxes imposed on it by North Carolina. 144 The Lim-
ited was engaged in the retail sale of clothing and accessories through
separate operating subsidiaries, nine of which were operating in North
Carolina. 145 A & F Trademark had a royalty and licensing agreement
with The Limited, much like the one between Geoffrey and Toys "R" Us
in Geoffrey 1 146 In a typical PIC transaction, the taxpayer, A & F Trade-
mark, was incorporated in Delaware and The Limited transferred cer-
"a /d. at 34.
139 Id.
140 See Kmart Props., 131 P.3d at 35-36.
141 Id. at 36.
142 Kmart corp., 131 P.3d at 23.
145 See 605 S.E.2d at 195.
144 Id. at 189.
145 Id. The nine retail companies were The Limited Stores, Inc., Cacique, Inc., Express,
Inc., Lane Bryant, Inc., Lerner, Inc., Limited Too, Inc., Structure, Inc., Victoria's Secret,
Inc., and Abercrombie & Fitch. Id. at 189 n.l.
'0 See id. at 189.
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tain trademarks to the taxpayer.' 47 North Carolina sought to levy a tax
on the income earned by A & F Trademark and the other taxpayers
through the use of their intellectual property in the state. 148
A & F Trademark argued that the presence of its intangible
property in North Carolina was irrelevant in light of its lack of physi-
cal presence in the state. 149 The court rejected A & F Trademark's ar-
guments, holding that the physical presence standard expounded by
the U. S. Supreme Court in Bellas Hess and Quill did not apply to in-
come taxes because the two types of taxes are not analogous in either
substance or result to the corp•orate income taxes at issue in A & F
Trademark.'" The court held that in this situation, where a wholly-
owned subsidiary licenses trademarks to a related retail company op-
erating stores located within North Carolina, there exists a substantial
nexus with the state sufficient to satisfy the Commerce Clause. 151
Therefore, the court upheld the income tax on the basis of A & F
Trademark's economic presence in North Carolina. 152
Economic presence was also upheld in Geoffrey, Inc. v. Oklahoma
Tax Commission ("Geoffrey If'), decided by the Civil Appeals Court of
Oklahoma in 2006, where Geoffrey once again appealed an income
• tax, this time in Oldahoma. 153 The income tax in this case was im-
posed on Geoffrey's royalties received from the licensing of its intan-
gible property in the state. 154 Geoffrey was a Delaware corporation
and had no physical presence in Oklahoma. 155 Geoffrey argued once
again for a physical presence standard, but the Court of Civil Appeals
of Oklahoma disagreed and held that the physical presence standard
did not apply to income taxes. 156 Furthermore, the court agreed with
the South Carolina court's decision in Geoffrey I that by licensing in-
tangibles for use in the state and deriving income from their use
there, Geoffrey had a substantial nexus with the state. 157 The court
went on to explain that taxation based on the presence of intangibles
in the state did not unduly burden interstate commerce because the
147 See id.
148 See A & F Trademark, 605 S.E.2d at 190.
148 Id. at 193.
1" See id. at 194-95.
181 Id. at 195.
1" See id.
188 See 132 P.3d at 633.
154 Id.
188 Id. at 634.
188 See id. at 637.
157 See id.
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benefits, protections, and opportunities that the state provided Geof-
frey justified the imposition on it. 158 Therefore, the income tax against
Geoffrey's royalty income was upheld. 159
In Lanco, Inc. v. Director; Division of Taxation, decided by the Su-
preme Court of New Jersey in 2006, New Jersey joined the ranks of
states endorsing the economic presence standard. 16° The issue in that
case was whether New Jersey could constitutionally subject an out-of-
state corporation to the state's "Corporation Business Tax" when that
corporation lacked physical presence in New Jersey but derived income
through a licensing agreement with a company conducting retail op-
erations in New Jersey. 161 In Lanco, a Delaware corporation with no real
property or offices in New Jersey, held and licensed trademarks and
trade names to Lane Bryant, a clothing retailer with stores in New Jer-
sey. 162 The New Jersey Suprerine Court affirmed the lower court's deci-
sion holding that the U. S. Supreme Court did not intend to create a
universal physical presence standard for state taxation under the
Commerce Clause. 163 The court explained that the requirement for a
substantial nexus is not the same as the physical presence requirement
set out in Bellas Hess.'" Thus, the court upheld the Corporation Busi-
ness Tax as applied to Lanco. 165
West Virginia was added to the list of states endorsing the eco-
nomic presence standard when in 2006, the Supreme Court of Appeals
affirmed a lower court ruling against MBNA America Bank in Tax
Commissioner v. MBNA America Bank, N.A. 166 MBNA was an out-of-state
corporation, which had its principal place of business and commercial
domicile in Delaware. 167 During 1998 and 1999, the two tax years in
question, MBNA had no real or tangible personal property and no em-
ployees located in West Virginia. 168 The principal business of MBNA is
issuing and servicing Visa and MasterCard credit cards, including the
extension of unsecured credit to customers who used those credit
166 See Geoffrey II, 132 P.3d at 638-39.
169 Id.
166 See Lanco II, 908 A.2d at 177.
161 Id. at 176. The New Jersey Corporate Business Tax is a franchise tax for the privi-
lege of doing business in New jersey. Olson, supra note 132, at 810 n.142.
162 Lanco, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation (Lanco I), 879 A.2d 1234, 1236 (N J. 2005).
163 Lanco 908 A.2d at 177.
564 See id.; see also Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758.
166 Lanai II, 908 A.2d at 177.
166 See MBNA, 640 S.E.2d at 236; Steager v. MBNA Am. Bank, No. 04.AA-157, slip op. at
11 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. June 27, 2005).
167 MBNA, 640 S.E.2d at 227.
188 Id.
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cards. 169 MBNA promoted its business in West Virginia via mail and
telephone solicitation)"
The sole issue before the court in MBNA America Bank was whether
the application of West Virginia's business franchise and income taxes
to MBNA, a business with no physical presence in the taxing state, vio-
lated the Commerce Clause. 171 The court concluded that Quill's physi-
cal presence requirement for substantial nexus applies only to sales and
use taxes and not to business franchise and corporate net income
taxes)" The court explained that when Bellas Hess was decided, it was
generally necessary that an entity have some sort of physical presence
in a state in order to do business in that state, but that this was no
longer the case.t 73 The growth and ubiquity of electronic commerce in
the current economy made it possible for a corporation to have a sig-
nificant economic presence in a state without having any physical pres-
ence there. 174 Therefore, a strict application of a physical presence
standard was a poor indicator of a corporation's nexus with a particular
state)"
The court in MBNA America Bank went on to suggest a significant
economic presence test for substantial nexus in lieu of a physical pres-
ence standard)" TheiCommerce Clause analysis under this test would
require an examination of the frequency, quantity, and systematic na-
ture of a taxpayer's economic contacts with a state. 177 Under the
Commerce Clause analysis, a taxpayer's exploitation of the state's
markets must be greater in degree than under the Due Process stan-
dard so that its economic presence can be characterized as significant
or substantial)"
Looking at the facts of the case, the court in MBNA America Bank
found that MBNA continuously and systematically engaged in direct mail
and telephone solicitation in West Virginia)" Additionally, in the tax
years at issue, MBNA had significant gross receipts attributable to West
109 m.
170 Id,
171 Id. at 229.
172 MBNA, 640 S.E.2d at 232.




177 MBNA, 640 S.E.2d at 234.
" Id at 235; see Quill, 504 U.S. at 313.
172 640 S.E.2d at 235.
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Virginia customers in the amounts of $8,419,431 and 1013,163,788. 1 $0 The
court concluded that MBNA America Bank's systematic and continuous
business activity in the state produced significant income attributable to
its West Virginia customers, and therefore, MBNA America had an eco-
nomic presence sufficient for a finding of substantial nexus. 181
Although the majority of state cases have found that an economic
presence is sufficient to support a state franchise and excise tax against
a nondomiciliary corporation, the Court of Appeals of Tennessee came
to the opposite conclusion in J.C. Penney National Bank v. Johnson. in
1999 . 182 T .j C. Penney National Bank ("JCPNB") was a federally chartered
national banking association incorporated in Delaware, with its princi-
pal place of business in Delaware) 83 Through its Delaware offices,
JCPNB offered consumer banking services such as deposit accounts,
home mortgage lending, general consumer loans, and ATM services)
In addition, JCPNB engaged in credit card lending through the issu-
ance of Visa and MasterCard credit cards. 183 JCPNB contracted with its
parent company, the J.C. Penney Company, to perform various market-
ing and processing services that were necessary to create and maintain
JCPNB's credit card business, and the J.C. Penney Company in turn
contracted with other companies to provide many of those services. 188
One of the contractors provided data processing, while another en-
gaged in marketing activities such as sending out credit card account
solicitations through the mail to potential customers throughout the
United States, including in Tennessee. 187 Other than the solicitations
that were mailed to Tennessee residents, none of the company's other
activities occurred in Tennessee. 188 Furthermore, all the entities in-
volved in JCPNB's credit card operation were located outside of Ten-
188 Id. at 236. In 1998 these revenues resulted in a West Virginia Business Franchise Tax
of $32,010 and a West Virginia Corporation Net Income Tax of $168,034. For 1999, MBNA
paid a Business Franchise Tax of $42,339 and a Corporation Net Income Tax of $220,897.
Id. at 228.
181 Id. at 236.
182 See 19 S.W.3d at 842. But see Laura II, 908 A.2d at 177; Kmart Props., 131 P.3d at 36; A
(IF Trademark, 605 S.E.2d at 195; Geoffrey II, 132 P.3d at 638; MBNA, 640 S.E.2d at 234.
"'VC. Penney, 19 S.W.3d at 832.
184 Id.
185 ,rd,
188 Id. at 833.
187 id.
'88 J.C. Penney, 19 S.W.3d at 833. There was no solicitation that specifically targeted
Tennessee residents. Id. at 833 n.4.
2007]	 Substantial Nexus in State Taxation of Corporate Income 	 1407
nessee and JCPNB did not maintain any offices or employees in the
state. 189
JCPNB's sole question to the court was whether its relationship
with Tennessee satisfied the substantial nexus requirement of the
Commerce Clause.'" JCPNB contended that its contacts with Tennes-
see did not provide a sufficient nexus under the Commerce Clause to
sustain the franchise and excise taxes that the Commissioner of Reve-
nue imposed upon it for doing business in the state. 191 The court noted
that the substantial nexus requirement is a means for limiting state
burdens on interstate commerce, but that there is not a specific point
at which substantial nexus exists. 192 The court, however, explained that
to satisfy the substantial nexus requirement the company's level of pres-
ence in a state must be more than merely doing business in the state. 193
The court rejected the Commissioner's argument that the physical
presence of the JCPNB credit cards in Tennessee constituted a basis for
finding a substantial nexus, because it noted that although a credit card
is tangible, its presence is not constitutionally significant in that it sim-
ply represents the customer's right to charge goods and services and is
not actually necessary to the transaction.'" Additionally, the court re-
jected the Commissioner's argument that the presence of J.C. Penney
retail stores in Tennessee created a substantial nexus, because it found
that the retail stores were not affiliated with JCPNB's Visa and Master-
Card credit card operations. 195 The court also stated that the activities
that allowed JCPNB to conduct its credit card operation did not occur
in Tennessee. 196 The court noted that the solicitation of accounts was
the most important activity' for the maintenance of JCPNB's business
and held that because the solicitation of accounts took place through
the mail, the solicitation was protected under Quill and was not enough
for a finding of substantial nexus. 197 Overall, the court failed to find that
substantial nexus requirement necessary to sustain the tax under the
Commerce Clause, thereby endorsing a physical presence standard.'"
199 Id. at 833.
190 Id. at 835.
191 Id. The total amount of taxes assessed against JCPNB was $178,314. Id. at 834.
192 Id. at 838.	 •
In SeeJ.C. Penney, 19'S.W.3d at 839.
I" Id. at 840.
196 See id. at 841.
196 Id. at 841-42.
1" Id. at 841.
Igo See JC Penney, 19 S.W.3d at 842. Three years later, the Court of Appeals of Tennes-
see clarified its position in J.C. Penney in America Online. See Am. Online, 2002 WI.. 1751434,
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II. A POSITIVE ANALYSIS OF SUBSTANTIAL NEXUS
A few overarching principles may be gleaned from the substantial
nexus decisions discussed so far.'" One such principle is that a tax on
an interstate activity may be sustained against a Commerce Clause chal-
lenge if it fulfills the four requirements set out by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Complete Auto Transit v. Brady in 1977.200
 The first prong of the
test requires that the taxed activity have a substantial nexus with the
taxing state."' In Quill Curd. v. North Dakota, decided in 1991, the Su-
preme Court held that substantial nexus requires something more than
just minimum contacts. 202 The vast majority of state courts that have
confronted the issue of substantial nexus have essentially decided in
favor of an economic presence standard, but their reasoning has not
always been consistent.203
A.' The Presence of Intangibles as a Justification for Substantial Nexus
A few state courts have relied on the presence of a corporation's
intangible property within the state as a basis for levying corporate
income taxes. 204 These courts have held that a traditional physical
presence, as evidenced by the presence of offices, facilities, employ-
ees, or real property, is not necessary when intangible property, such
as trademarks or trade names, are being used in the state." 5 This rea-
soning has been used in cases where a corporation contesting 'the tax
is a PIC.206 The presence and use of the intangible property within a
at *2. The court stated that it was "not [its] purpose to decide whether 'physical presence'
[was] required under the Commerce Clause," and that the ultimate standard was substan-
tial nexus. See id.
2" See Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n (Geoffrey 1), 437 S.E.2d 13, 18 (S.C. 1993);
Am. Online, Inc. v. Johnson, No. M2001-00927-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WI. 1751434, at *3
(Tenn. Ct. App. July 30, 2002); Tax Comm'r v. MBNA Am. Bank, NA, 640 S.E.2d 226, 234
(W. Va. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2997 (2007).
200 See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1991); Complete Auto Transit,
Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977); Geoffrey I, 437 S.E.2d at 18.
2°1 Quill, 504 U.S. at 311; Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 279; Geoffrey I, 437 S.E.2d at
18.
202 Quill, 504 U.S. at 313; see Geoffrey, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm'n (Geoffrey II), 132 P.3d
632, 636 (Okla. Civ. App. 2006); J.C. Penney Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 19 S.W.Sd 831, 838
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
20y
	 Geoffrey I, 437 S.E.2d at 18; Am. Online, 2002 WI. 1751434, at *3; MBNA, 640
S.E.2d at 234.
204 See A & F Trademark, Inc. V. Tolson, 605 S.E.2d 187, 195 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004); Geof-
frey I, 437 S.E.2d at 18.
"5 See A C.1' F Trademark, 605 S.E.2d at 195; Geoffrey I, 437 S.E.2d at 18.
2°6 See A & F Trademaric 605 S.E.2d at 195; Geoffrey I, 437 S.E.2d at 18.
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state has formed the basis for subjecting the PIC to corporate income
taxation in certain cases. 207
The presence of intangibles in the state was the justification for
the Supreme Court of South Carolina's 1993 decision in Geoffrey, Inc.
v. South Carolina Tax Commission. 288 In that case, Geoffrey was a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Toys "R" Us, incorporated and with its principal
offices in Delaware.206 In 1984 Toys "R." Us transferred several valuable
trademarks and trade names, including "Toys 'R' Us," to Geoffrey and
then licensed the use of those marks back to Toys "R" Us for a royalty
on the net sales by Toys "R" Us. 210 This licensing arrangement was
very lucrative, because through it Geoffrey earned millions of dollars
in income but paid income taxes to no state. 211
Geoffrey relied on Quill and contended that it did not have a sub-
stantial nexus with SoUth Carolina because it was not physically pre-
sent in that state. 212 The court disagreed with Geoffrey, stating that
the U.S. Supreme Court in Quill had not extended the physical pres-•
ence standard to taxes other than sales and use taxes. 213 The court
then stated unequivocally that the presence of intangible property
alone is sufficient to establish a nexus. 214 Therefore, the court held
that by licensing intangibles, such as trademarks and trade names, in
South Carolina, and deriving income from their use there, Geoffrey
had a substantial nexus with South Carolina. 216
The Court of Appeals of North Carolina used similar reasoning
in A & F Trademark, Inc. v. Tolson in 2004. 216 In a typical PIC transac-
267 See A Co'F Trademark 605 S.E.2d at 195; Geoffrey 1, 437 S.E.2d at 18.
266 437 S.E.2d at 18.
269 Id, at 15.
210 Id
211 See id. at 15n.1.
212 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 317; Geoffrey I, 437 S.E.2d at 18.
216 See Geoffrey 1, 437 S.E.2d at 18 n.4.
214 Id. at 18. Note that there is a difference between a state having jurisdiction over the
income generated in that state and jurisdiction over the taxpayer that generates income
that state. See 1 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION 6-54
to -55 (3d ed. Supp. 2006). The situation is analogous to specific versus general jurisdic-
tion in personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. See id. If a taxpayer derives income from the
use of intangible property in a state, that state may tax the income and enforce the tax by
imposing a withholding obligation on the in-state licensees of the intangible property. See
id. However, the state does not necessarily have general jurisdiction over the taxpayer such
that the state can force the taxpayer to pay a direct tax to the state. See lit The controversy
surrounding substantial nexus centers on the amount of contact a taxpayer must have with
a state before the state can force the taxpayer to pay taxes directly to the state. See id.
216 Geoffrey I, 437 S.E.2d at 18.
216 605 S.E.2d at 195.
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tion, the taxpayer was incorporated in Delaware, and the parent com-
pany, The Limited, transferred certain trademarks to the taxpayer. 217
North Carolina sought to levy a tax on the income The Limited
earned by its use of A & F Trademark and the other taxpayers' intel-
lectual property in the state. 218
Once again, the taxpayers contended that they did not have a
substantial nexus with North Carolina because they had no physical
presence in that state. 219 Therefore, the presence of the taxpayers'
intangible property in the state was irrelevant in light of the lack of a
physical presence. 22° The court disagreed with the taxpayers, however,
and held that where a wholly-owned subsidiary licenses trademarks to
a related retail company operating stores located within North Caro-
lina, there exists a substantial nexus with the state. 22' That is, the use
of the intangibles in the state creates a substantial nexus. 222
Although South Carolina and North Carolina have both upheld
corporate income taxes based on the presence of intangibles within the
state, their reasoning is somewhat suspect because it is based on a the-
ory of in rem jurisdiction. 223 The U.S. Supreme Court disclaimed strict
in rem jurisdiction in Shaffer v. Heitner in 1977, but it did suggest that
where the property is the subject of the litigation, such jurisdiction may
be appropriate. 224 The Court, however, was concerned with due process
and notice in Shaffer, and not with substantial nexus. 225 The Court in
217 See id. at 189.
218 See id.
219 Id. at 193. ,
228 Id.
221 A Es' F Trademark, 605 S.E.2d at 195.
222 See id.
223 See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 214, at 6-54 to -55. Jerome and Walter
Hellerstein point out that the South Carolina court's suggestion that the mere presence of
the intangible property in South Carolina is sufficient to find a substantial nexus is dubi-
ous because it is based on a theory of in rem jurisdiction, a type of jurisdiction that was
repudiated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Shaffer v, Heitner. See id. at 6-58. Despite the dubi-
ous reasoning, however, the Hellersteins do not conclude that the case was wrongly de-
cided, based on the differences between sales and use taxes and income taxes, and based
on South Carolina's jurisdiction over Geoffrey's income earned in South Carolina. Id. at 6-
59. In rem jurisdiction is defined as a "court's power to adjudicate the rights to a given
piece of property, including the power to seize and hold it." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 869
(8th ed. 2004).
224 See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207, 209 (1977) (holding that jurisdiction may
not be asserted based solely on the presence of the defendant's property in the state where
that property is not the subject of the litigation).
223 See id. at 207. The Due Process Clause requires sufficient notice and the Court im-
plicitly held that where a defendant's property in a state is the subject matter of the litiga-
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Quill observed that substantial nexus required something more than
due process, so perhaps a theory of corporate income taxation based
solely on the presence of intangibles within the state will not suffice. 226
The presence of intangibles must be supplemented with something
more in order to satisfy the requirements set out in Qui/L227
B. Generation of Income as a justification for Substantial Nexus
Other state courts have provided this "something more" by rely-
ing not on any kind of presence in the state, but on the generation of
corporate revenue attributable to that state. 228 These courts have held
that when the corporation derives income from the use of its intangi-
ble property in the state, there exists a substantial nexus sufficient to
subject the corporation to income taxes. 229
In 2006 in Lanco, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation the Supreme
Court of New Jersey decided the most recent case regarding the im-
position of income taxes on out-of-state PICs. 230 In Lanco, the Superior
Court Appellate Division noted that the corporation had no physical
presence in the state and derived income from a New Jersey source
only pursuant to a license agreement with another corporation that
conducted a retail business in New Jersey. 231 The New Jersey Supreme
Court upheld the decision of the Superior Court Appellate Division,
finding that physical presence is not a requirement for imposing a
corporation business tax.232
Neither the lower court nor the Supreme Court discussed the
amount of income that Lanco derived from its license agreement. 233
The absence of such discussion implies that any amount of income is
tion, the property provides sufficient contacts with that state to sustain jurisdiction over the
defendant. See id.
"6 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 313.
"7 See id.
" 778 See Lana), Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 908 A.2d 176, 176 (NJ. 2006) (Lanco H) (af-
firming the New Jersey Court of Appeals' decision), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2973 (2007);
Kmart Props., Inc. v. Taxation and Revenue Dep't, 131 P.3d 27, 36 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001),
cert. granted, 40 P.3d 1008 (N.M. 2002), cert. quashed, 131 P.3d 22 (N.M. 2005); Geoffrey II,
132 P.3d at 634 (affirming the Oklahoma Tax Commission's finding); MBNA, 640 S.E.2d at
236.
22a See Lanco if, 908 A.2d at 176; Kmart Props., 131 P.3d at 36; Geoffrey II, 132 P.3d at 634.
230 908 A.2d at 177.
23 ' Lanco, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation (Lanco I), 879 A.2d 1234, 1235 (N.J. 2005).
23! Lanco H, 908 A.2d at 177; see Lanco 4 879 A.2d at 1238.
213 See Lanco II 908 A.2d at 176-77; Lanco I, 879 A.2d at 1238.
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sufficient to create a substantial nexus between the corporation and
the taxing state. 254
Other states, however, have required that the income generated
in a state be significant or substantia1. 235 In 2006 the Civil Appeals
Court of Oklahoma in Geoffrey, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission (Geof-
frey II) reviewed the very same PIC transaction that was at issue in Geof-
frey, Inc v. South Carolina Tax Commission (Geoffrey /). 236 The facts in
both cases were essentially the same. 257 In Geoffrey II, the court implic-
itly affirmed the finding by the Oklahoma Tax Commission that the
licensing of Geoffrey intangible property for use within the Oklahoma
market establishes substantial nexus. 239 The court explained that taxa-
tion based on the royalties earned in the state did not unduly burden
interstate commerce.239 The benefits, protections, and opportunities
the state provided Geoffrey justified the imposition on interstate
commerce, so long as the income generated by the corporation
within the state was.substantia1. 24°
The Appeals Court of New Mexico came to a similar conclusion in
Kmart Properties, Inc v. Taxation and Revenue Department in 2001. 241 In
that case, KPI was a wholly-owned Michigan subsidiary of Kmart Corpo-
ration, and as a PIC it owned and managed intellectual property previ-
ously developed by Kmart Corporation.242 Kmart Corporation created
KPI for the purpose of holding title to and managing Kmart's trade-
marks, trade names, and service marks. 243
The court held that the use of KPI's marks by Kmart Corporation
within New Mexico's economic market, for the purpose of generating
substantial income for KPI, established a sufficient nexus between that
income and the legitimate interests of the state and justified the impo-
sition of a state income tax. 244 Therefore, the court upheld the imposi-
tion of New Mexico's state income tax on KPI's earnings. 245 The court
2s4 See Lanco II, 908 A.2d at 176-17; Lanco I, 879 A.2d at 1238.
235 See Kmart Props., 131 P.3d at 36; Geoffrey II, 132 P.3d at 634; MBNA, 640 S.E.2d at 236.
238 See Geoffrey II, 132 P.3d at 634; Geoffrey I, 437 S.E.2d at 15. Both cases involved Geof-
frey, Inc., a PIC established by Toys 'R" Us for the purpose of holding Toys ne Us's intan-
gible property. See Geoffrey II, 132 13,3d at 634; Geoffrey I, 437 S.E.2d at 15.
2" See Geoffrey II, 132 P.3d at 634; Geoffrey 1, 437 S.E.2d at 15.
238 See Geoffrey II, 132 P.3d at 634.
239 See id. at 640.
249 See id. at 634, 638.
241 See Kmart Pis., 131 P.3d at 36.
242 Id. at 30.
243 Id.
244 Id. at 36.
245 Id.
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distinguished income taxes from the sales and use taxes addressed in
Quill based on the burdens that each place on interstate commerce and
as a result, held that the assessment of state income tax on KPI's royalty
revenues was not an undue burden on interstate commerce. 246 Once
again, the court stated that the amount of income generated in the
state by the corporation must be substantial for the taxpayer corpora-
tion to have a sufficient nexus with the taxing state. 247
In 2006 in Tax Commissioner v. MBNA America Bank, N.A., the Su-
preme Court of Appeals of West Virginia indicated that a corpora-
tion's activity in a state must generate significant income in . order for
it to be subject to taxation in that state. 248 The principal business of
MBNA America Bank was issuing and servicing Visa and MasterCard
credit cards, including the extension of unsecured credit to customers
who used those credit cards. 249 MBNA promoted its business in West
Virginia via mail and telephone solicitation. 25°
Instead of using the physical presence standard as the basis for the
substantial nexus analysis, the court in MBNA America Bank suggested
using a significant economic presence test. 251 The significant economic
presence test would require an examination of the frequency, quantity,
and systematic nature of a taxpayer's economic contacts with a state.252
For its economic presence to be characterized as significant or substan-
tial under the Commerce Clause, a taxpayer's exploitation of the state's
markets must be greater in degree than under the Due Process arialy-
sis. 253
Looking at the facts of the case, the court observed that MBNA
continuously and systematically engaged in direct mail and telephone
solicitation in West Virghila. 254 Additionally, in the tax years at issue,
MBNA had significant gross receipts attributable to West Virginia cus-
248 See Kmart Props., 131 P.3d at 35, 36. The court distinguished the two types of taxes by
explaining that, 'unlike an income tax, a sales and use tax can make the taxpayer an agent
of the state, obligated to collect the tax from the consumer at the point of sale and then
pay it over to the taxing entity." Id. at 35. Additionally, "a state income tax is usually paid
only once a year, to one taxing jurisdiction at one rate," whereas "a sales and use tax can be
due periodically to more than one taxing jurisdiction within a state and at varying rates."
Id.
247 See id. at 36.
248 See MBNA, 640 S.E.2d at 236.
349 Id. at 227.
250 Id.
" I Id. at 234.
" 3 Id.
sss MBNA, 640 S.E.2d at 235; see Quig 504 U.S. at 313.
254 MBNA, 640 S.E.2d at 235.
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tomers in the amounts of $8,419,431 and $10,163,788. 255 The court
concluded that MBNA America Bank's systematic and continuous busi-
ness activity in the state produced significant income attributable to its
West Virginia customers, which indicated a significant economic pres-
ence sufficient for a substantial nexus. 256
In America Online, Inc. v. Johnson, decided in 2002 by the Appeals
Court of Tennessee, the court provided an interesting twist in the sub-
stantial nexus debate. 257 America Online is an Internet Service Pro-
vider and consequently did not have any regular employees in the
state, nor did they own or lease any real property there. 258 Instead of
focusing on the economic or physical presence of America Online in
Tennessee, the court in America Online observed that substantial nexus
exists when activities are being conducted in the taxing state on be-
half of the corporation. 259 Although the court ultimately remanded
the case without ruling on whether America Online had a substantial
nexus with Tennessee, the court endorsed a very broad notion of sub-
stantial nexus, for very few, if an businesses can claim that they do
not have any businesses in the taxing state helping to make their ser-
vices available in that state. 260
The state courts that have addressed the issue of substantial
nexus have relied on several different justifications for finding nexus
when a corporation does not have a traditional physical presence in
the taxing state. 261 A finding of a substantial nexus based solely on the
presence of intangible property in a state seems too narrow to en-
compass all the possible types of businesses that may be solely eco-
nomically present in a state. 262 On the other hand, a finding of nexus
based on activities being conducted in the state on behalf of the cor-
poration seems too broad as it would encompass almost any conceiv-
able business.269 If the U.S. Supreme Court were ever to take up this
issue again, it would most likely agree with a standard that is in be-
255 Id. at 236.
2" Id. But see J.C. Penney, 19 S.W.3d at 842 (holding, in a very similar fact pattern in-
volving a credit card company, that there was no substantial nexus with the state that would
justify the imposition of corporate income taxes, thereby endorsing a physical presence
standard).
.257 See Am. Online, 2002 WL 1751434, at *1
"8 See id. at *1.
59 See id. at *3.
260 See id. at *4.
"I See Lanco II, 908 A.2d at 176; Geoffrey I, 437 S.E.2d at 18; Am. Online, 2002 WL
1751434, at *3; MI3NA, 640 S.E.2d at 236.
262 See A eg F Trademark, 605 S.E.2d at 195; Geoffrey I,  437 S.E.2d at 18.
2" See Am. Online, 2002 WL 1751434, at *3.
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tween these two extremes—economic presence based on a significant
amount of revenue attributable to the taxing state. 264
FUTURE APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC PRESENCE
SUBSTANTIAL NEXUS
Recent state cases addressing substantial nexus for corporate in-
come tax all adopt an economic presence standard instead of a tradi-
tional physical presence standard. 266 As the economic presence stan-
dard is adopted by court after court, the next question becomes
whether there is a limit to the economic presence standard and what
that limit is? Some of the state court decisions held that a substantial
nexus existed based on the presence of a company's intangible prop-
erty in the taxing state. 266 More frequently, however, courts held that a
substantial nexus existed when a corporation could attribute a signifi-
cant amount of income to the taxing state. 267 Those decisions pave the
way for a number of different types of industries to be taxed by states in
which they have an economic presence, but no traditional physical
presence.268 Some areas that are likely to be affected by the expansion
of this doctrine are the film industry, online retailers of services or in-
tangible property, utilities companies, software companies, and fran-
chising companies. 269
Yeti
	 Kmart Props., 131 P.3d at 36; MBNA. 640 S.E.2d at 236. Although a number of in-
terested parties filed amicus briefs to force the Supreme Court to take notice of the issue,
the Court recently denied certiorari to both Lanco and MBNA , who filed certiorari peti-
tions in March 2007, challenging the rulings in New Jersey and West Virginia, respectively.
See generally Lanco II, 908 A.2d 176, cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2973 (2007); MBNA, 640 S.E.2d
226, cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2997 (2007); John Buhl, Lanco, MBNA to Petition Supreme Court
for Review of Nexus Cases, 114 TAX Notes 646 (2007).
255 See, e.g., Lanco, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation (Lanco II), 908 A.2d 176, 177 (N.J.
2006), cert denied, 127 S. Ct. 2973 (2007); Kmart Props:, Inc. v. Taxation and Revenue
Dep't, 131 P.3d 27, 36 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001), cert. granted, 40 P.3d 1008 (N.M. 2002), cert.
quashed, 131 P.3d 22 (N.M. 2005); A & F Trademark, Inc. v. Tolson, 605 S.E.2d 187, 195
(N.C. Ct. App. 2004); Geoffrey, Inc. v. Okla, Tax Comm'n (Geoffrey II ), 132 P.3d 632, 634
(Okla. Civ. App. 2006); Tax Comm'r v. MBNA Am. Bank, NA., 640 S.E.2d 226, 234 (W. Va.
2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2997 (2007).
265 See A 6' F Trademant, 605 S.E.2d at 195; Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Cornm'n (Geoffrey
.1), 437 S.E.2d 13, 18 (S.C. 1993).
267 See Kmart Props., 131 P.3d at 36; MBNA, 640 S.E.2d at 236.
256 See MBNA, 640 S.E.2d at 234; Business Tax Hearing, supra note 26, at 1; Craig J. Lang-
straat & Emily S. Lemmon, Economic Nexus: Legislative Presumption or Legitimate Proposition?,
14 AKRON TAX J. 1, 9 (1999).
2" See MBNA, 640 S.E.2d at 234; Business Tax Hearing, supra note 26, at 144-46; Lang-
straat & Lemmon, supra note 268, at 9.
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A motion picture company could be taxed in all states where its
films or television shows are viewed if the economic presence nexus
standard continues to appl 27° For example, if the motion picture
company is incorporated in Delaware and distributes its feature films
throughout the country for viewing in movie theatres, it is earning in-
come in each of those states, and therefore has an economic presence
in those states."' The same is true of direct distributors of movies, such
as Netflix, the online entertainment subscription service, which sends
rented DVDs to its customers throughout the country by mail. 272
Through online rental of films, the company is generating significant
income and therefore has a substantial nexus with those states where its
customers live. 273 This situation is analogous to some of the PIC cases
because there is some property located in the various states in the form
of the films themselves, and the significant income generated from the
use of those films creates an economic presence in those states. 274
Software companies are in a similar situation. 275 Computer soft-
ware is a product that can be distributed using a variety of tech-
niques. 276 Copies of computer software can be delivered electronically
using the Internet.277 Companies delivering computer software over the
Internet are licensing intangible property into all the states in which
they do business. 278 Therefore, a company could be economically pre-
sent in all the states where income is generated from the license and
use of their intangible property. 2" As in some of the PIC cases, the li-
no See MBNA, 690 S.E.2d at 234; Business Tax Hearing, supra note 26, at 157.
271 See MBNA, 640 S.E.2d at 234; Viacom, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1-14
(Mar. 16, 2006). •
272 See Kmart Props., 131 P.3d at 36; Geoffrey a 132 P.3d at 634; Netflix Corporate Factsheet,
http://files.shareholder.com/downloacls/NFLX/115849138x0x24776/1F1055CII-DCB13-475A-
87CD-03F6091D4901/factsheet.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2007).
275 See Kmart Props., 131 P.3d at 36; MBNA, 640 S.E.2d at 236; Netflix Corporate Factsheet,
http://files.shareholdencom/downloads/NFLX/1158491380x24776/1F105503-DCBS-475A-
87C1/{/3F6091D4901/factsheet.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2007).
274 See Kmart Props., 131 P.3d at 36; Geoffrey II, 132 P.3d at 634.
275 See Business Tax Hearing, supra note 26, at 2; Langstraat & Lemmon, supra note 268,
at 14.
276 Business Tax Hearing, supra note 26, at 209.
277 Id.
278 See Langstraat & Lemmon, supra note 268, at 9. For a variety of legal and business
reasons, software companies generally do not "sell" copies of their products to their cus-
tomers. Business Tax Heating, supra note 26, at 209. Instead, they distribute copies of their
products subject to a license agreement. Id. Therefore, the software company will retain an
ownership interest in every one of those copies no matter where the customer chooses to
use them. See id,
279 See Kmart Props., 131 P.3d at 36; Geoffrey 14 132 P.3d at 634; Business Tax Hearing, su-
pra note 26, at 211.
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cense and use of the intangible property in the state, and the genera-
don of significant income from that licensing, could create a substantial
nexus with the state. 280
Another industry that could be affected by a validation of the
economic presence standard is online retailers of services or intangi-
ble property.281 Any company with a website through which it sells a
service or intangible property would have an economic presence in all
the states in which it does business, and for many companies, that
could be all fifty states. 282 It is likely that a court would find that an
online retailer of services or intangibles has a substantial nexus with
the states in which it does a significant amount of business. 288
Similarly, utility companies could be open to taxation by states in
which they simply have an economic presence. 284 Since the restructur-
ing of the electric industry, consumers have been able to buy electric-
ity from providers outside of their state. 285 These utilities can sell elec-
tricity to citizens of a state without having any physical presence in
that state.288 The utilities, however, do have an economic presence in
the states where they sell electricity based on the income generated
from those sales. 287 The economic presence of the utility would create
280 See Kmart Props., 131 P.3d at 36; Geoffrey II, 132 P.3d at 634.
281 See 15 U.S.C. § 381 (2000) (providing a safe harbor from income taxation for
online sellers of tangible property, but not for sellers of intangible property or services);
Business Tax Hearing, supra note 26, at 2; Langstraat & Lemmon, supra note 268, at 14. An
example of an online service retailer is Expedia, Inc., which allows customers to research,
plan, and book travel through their online website. Expedia, Inc., Annual Report (Form
10-K), at 2 (Mar. 31, 2006). An example of an online retailer of intangible property is Ap-
ple, Inc.'s iTunes Music Store, which is a service that allows customers to find, purchase,
and download third-party digital music, audio books, music videos, short Films, television
shows, movies, and iPod games. Apple, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-10, at 11 {Dec. 12,
2006).
282 See Business Tax Hearing, supra note 26, at 2; Langstraat & Lemmon, supra note 268,
at 14.
283 See Kmart Maps., 131 P.3d at 36; MBNA, 640 S.E.2d at 236.
284 See generally MATTHEW H. BROWN & KELLY HILL, FRANCHISE TAXES AND CORPORATE
NET INCOME TAXES IN THE CHANGING ELECTRIC INDUSTRY (1997), http://www.ncslorg/pro-
grarnsienergy/fmntaxe.htm.
288 See id. The restructuring provided that consumers in about a dozen states could
choose their electricity provider instead of having to rely on the local utility company. See
id.
286 See id. P.L. 86-272 shelters a taxpayer from income taxes if its only interaction with a
state is solicitation for the sale of tangible property. See id. States are divided on the nature
of electricity as tangible personal property. See id. If it is tangible personal property, then it
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a sufficient nexus for income taxation, provided that the company
generates a significant amount of income from the taxing state. 2ss
Franchising companies could also be affected by the adoption of
the economic presence standard.289 In the franchise industry, the busi-
ness relationship between a franchisor and a franchisee is centered on
a shared trade identity that is established and maintained by the fran-
chisor's license of its trademarks and other intellectual property to its
franchisees.29° These licensing relationships may cross state lines, al-
though the franchisor might not have any physical presence in the
states where the franchisees operate. 291 This relationship is similar to
the relationships in the PIC cases because the use of the franchisor's
intellectual property in the states where its franchisees are located gen-
erates income for the franchisor through royalty payments. 292 A signifi-
cant amount of income is the basis for the franchisor's economic pres-
ence in those states where it has franchisees, and therefore creates a
substantial nexus with the state. 293 Therefore, those states where a fran-
chisee is located may impose income taxes on the franchisor. 294
CONCLUSION
The Commerce Clause requirement of a substantial nexus can be
met through an economic presence standard, as state courts have re-
cently held. The economic presence standard seeks to tax those cor-
porations that are deriving income from a state, even if that corpora-
tion has no physical presence in the state. In the years since Complete
Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady first articulated the concept of substantial
nexus, the concept has greatly evolved. Recent state cases have relied
on different justifications for imposing taxes on corporations that do
not have a traditional physical presence within the state. Although
some states have based a finding of a substantial nexus on the pres-
ence of intangibles in the state, and other states have relied simply on
the fact that the corporation was doing business in the state, the U.S.
Supreme Court is likely to find a standard somewhere in between the
288 See MBNA, 640 S.E.2d at 236.
389 See Business Tax Hearing, supra note 26, at 148.
288 Id. at 149.
"1 See id.
292 SCE' id.; see also Kmart Props., 131 P.3d at 36; Geoffrey II, 132 P.3d at 634.
295 See Kmart Props., 131 P.3d at 36; Geoffrey II, 132 P.3d at 634; MBNA, 640 S.E.2d at 236;
Business Tax Hearing, supra note 26, at 149.
284 See Kmart Props., 131 13.3d at 36; Geoffrey H, 132 P.3d at 634; MBNA, 640 S.E.2d at 236;
Business Tax Hearing, supra note 26, at 149.
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two if it decides to take up the issue. A standard for a substantial
nexus based on a significant amount of income attributable to the
state is the likely result, ultimately doing away with any traditional
physical presence standard.
An economic presence standard opens the door for state taxation
of many types of industries that were previously untouchable. The
film industry, software industry, online retailers of services and intan-
gibles, utilities, and franchisors will all be affected by such an expan-
sion of substantial nexus.
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